Resources with keywords: select agent
Sporadic H5N1 human infections continue; all linked to direct animal contact. Agricultural research workers, poultry handlers, and veterinary staff conducting field work face the highest occupational risk. Clade 2.3.4.4b dominant globally. Research staff working with live avian influenza virus must comply with FSAP registration requirements (H5N1 is a Select Agent). No sustained human-to-human transmission detected as of 18 May 2026.
Two suspected cases in Italy (travelers from Uganda to Lombardy) ruled out by laboratory testing on 25 May. ECDC assesses EU/EEA HCW and laboratory worker infection risk as very low but not zero. Imported case scenario underscores need for clinical laboratories to maintain front-line screening protocols and for hospital EDs to implement triage-based isolation.
CDC HAN advisory directed at U.S. clinicians, laboratorians, and public health practitioners. CDC issued Level 3 Travel Health Notice for DRC; Level 1 for Uganda. Clinical laboratories instructed to use standard contact and droplet precautions during specimen collection, and to notify public health before processing specimens from febrile patients with relevant travel history. No U.S. cases as of 25 May 2026. One American HCW medically evacuated from DRC to Germany for isolation.
Outbreak originated in a healthcare facility in Mongbwalu Health Zone, Ituri. HCW exposure documented in the index cluster. WHO deploying IPC surge teams. Alert to U.S. hospital infection control teams: any patient presenting with hemorrhagic fever syndrome and travel history to Ituri/N. Kivu requires immediate isolation and notification.
Bundibugyo virus is a BSL-4/Select Agent pathogen with no licensed vaccine or therapeutic. As of 26 May 2026: 105 confirmed + 906 suspected cases; ≥234 deaths in DRC (Ituri, N. Kivu, S. Kivu); 7 confirmed cases in Uganda. Healthcare workers without adequate PPE face high infection risk. U.S. labs handling Ebola must comply with FSAP Tier 1 requirements. All clinical laboratories must implement immediate IPC measures for patients with travel history to DRC/Uganda.
First peer-reviewed report of H5N5 human infection in a 75-year-old immunocompromised patient. Nasal swab RT-PCR was initially negative; confirmed only via deep sequencing. This has direct implications for laboratory workers: standard influenza diagnostic assays may miss novel subtypes in immunocompromised patients. Biosafety officers should review subtype-specific testing protocols and PPE for novel subtype specimen processing.
Genotype D1.1 H5N1 viruses replicate significantly more efficiently in human nasal epithelium organoids than genotype B3.13. This finding has direct biosafety implications for laboratory workers: D1.1 strains pose greater occupational infection risk and may require enhanced containment measures beyond current BSL-3 enhanced (Ag) standards. Dual-use research of concern (DURC) policies apply. Biosafety officers at labs conducting avian influenza research should review containment adequacy for D1.1 strains.
Rich SN, Hinckley AF, Earley A, Petersen JM, Mead PS, Kugeler KJ
Tularemia is a rare nationally notifiable zoonosis, caused by the tier-1 select agent Francisella tularensis, that has been reported from all U.S. states except Hawaii.
This notice temporarily exempts H5 avian influenza viruses from the requirements of the regulations listed in 9 C.F.R. Part 121 for a period of three years; this exemption is consistent with protecting animal health and animal products while allowing more laboratories to conduct research and develop solutions to address the disease. This exemption replaces all previously issued and currently effective exemptions related to H5 avian influenza viruses.
