Resources with keywords: BSL-2

CDC ArboNET and Florida health bulletins confirmed ongoing domestic Zika surveillance, recording 5 travel-associated cases nationally with zero local vector transmission in 2026. Public health advisories emphasize aggressive differential testing in febrile patients. Diagnostic laboratories are alerted to extensive serological IgM cross-reactivity between Zika and Dengue viruses, which complicates antibody confirmation. Clinicians must order molecular RT-PCR on serum and urine to assess fetal microcephaly risks. Diagnostic specimen processing must be performed within certified Class II Biosafety Cabinets under BSL-2 containment.

On September 10, 2026, the CDC issued CDCHAN-00533 warning of rising human rabies exposures and post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) delivery errors. Inquiries rose 17%, with a 76% surge in rabies immune globulin (HRIG) use. Key clinical errors include gluteal vaccination, failing to infiltrate wounds with HRIG, and co-administering HRIG and vaccine in the same syringe. Routine diagnostic work on animal neural tissues or patient specimens requires BSL-2 containment by pre-vaccinated personnel. High-concentration viral propagation strictly requires BSL-3 facilities.

State health notices documented fatal tick-borne infections across the Northeast. Rhode Island confirmed a fatal neuroinvasive Powassan virus case, marking the state’s third case in 2026. Simultaneously, Stony Brook Medicine confirmed the emergence of Bourbon virus on Long Island, transmitted by expanding Lone Star ticks (Amblyomma americanum). Bourbon virus causes acute leukopenia, thrombocytopenia, and organ failure with no commercial diagnostic assays. Laboratories performing tick identification or clinical blood analysis must operate under BSL-2 containment inside Class II Biosafety Cabinets, with tick dissection restricted to secondary containment.

Aloosh M, Saeed HM, Mataseje LF
KPC-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae transmission documented in a long-term care facility, underscoring HCW role in CRE transmission. In the U.S., CRE infections surged 69% in 2025; NDM-producing strains increased 461%. Healthcare workers in ICUs, wound care, and catheter management are at highest occupational exposure risk. Contact precautions, dedicated equipment, and environmental decontamination are the primary control measures. Clinical laboratory staff should handle CRE cultures under BSL-2 containment.

As of 18 May: 10 cases (8 lab-confirmed), 3 deaths. No confirmed U.S. Andes virus cases. Clinical laboratories advised to handle specimens from suspected HPS patients under BSL-2 enhanced precautions (Class II BSC, respirator). Andes virus is NOT a U.S. Select Agent, but laboratory directors should review biosafety risk assessments for specimen processing. Serology (IgM/IgG ELISA) and RT-PCR are diagnostic methods of choice; CDC DHCPP available for testing support.