

Considerations for Handling Potential Viral Hemorrhagic Fever (VHFs) Samples

These considerations do not override any regulatory or country-specific mandates. This document provides general considerations for handling potential VHF samples; however, a pathogen-specific risk assessment must be conducted for each cases.¹

BSL2 with enhanced BSL3 practices

Laboratory procedures:

- Diagnostic handling of blood or body fluids (urine, throat washing, tissue specimens, blood, cerebrospinal fluid, pleural and peritoneal fluid) of a person who is sick with or has died from VHF disease – excludes viral amplification
- Contact with objects or surfaces that have been contaminated with body fluids (like blood, feces, vomit) from a person sick with the disease or who has died from the disease.

Healthcare practices:

- Collection of clinical specimens – point of care analysis
- Assess the risks prior to specimen collection-see the NETEC considerations¹
- The CDC provides the following examples for occupational exposure²:
 - Providing health care, performing environmental cleaning, or handling waste in an Ebola treatment unit (ETU), or for patients with Bundibugyo Virus Disease (BVD) in any clinical setting
 - Entry into a patient care area of an ETU for any reason
 - Providing health care to an acutely ill patient not known to have BVD
 - Environmental cleaning or handling of waste in a regular healthcare facility
 - Clinical laboratory work associated with a treatment unit or other health care setting
 - Burial work

Laboratory Practices

- Review reference documents to ensure that your SOPs are current
 - Good (Standard) Laboratory Practices - US HHS - CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories 6th Edition Appendix N – Clinical Laboratories.³
 - Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Guidelines for Safe Work Practices in Human and Animal Medical Diagnostic Laboratories Recommendations of a CDC-convened, Biosafety Blue Ribbon Panel for biosafety practices in virology laboratories, page 55⁴
 - ISO 35001:2019 Biorisk management for laboratories and other related organisations⁵
 - CEN Workshop Agreement 15793: Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard⁶
 - In the USA: follow the OSHA Bloodborne Pathogens Standard⁷
 - Government of Canada – Biosafety guidelines for laboratories handling specimens from patients under investigation for Ebola disease⁸
- Pre-analytical risk assessment (reference CDC Clinical Guidance for Ebola⁹)
 - Travel and exposure history
 - Clinical syndrome compatibility
 - Epidemiological linkage to known outbreaks
 - Coordination with public health authorities
 - Differential diagnosis considerations (e.g., malaria, typhoid fever, severe bacterial infections)
- Risk Assessment considerations:
 - Activities to be performed, their location, and responsible personnel
 - Review data or fact sheets about the closest virus known¹⁰
 - Potential for sprays, splashes, aerosols
 - Patient status (screening, suspected, confirmed)
 - Collecting samples v. handling samples
 - Inactivation of samples (buffers, fixed smears, temperature)¹¹
 - Use of Point of Care instruments v. automated laboratory equipment
 - Assessment of whether Laboratory-Acquired Infections (LAI) infections linked to similar procedure¹²
 - Potential for animal samples to be processed
 - Apply a risk-based approach to all laboratory manipulations, considering:^{13, 14}
 - specimen type
 - procedure performed
 - likelihood of aerosol generation
 - staff competency
 - engineering controls available
- Standard Precautions During Sample or Specimen Testing
 - Have a laboratory activation checklist. See example provided by the National Emerging Special Pathogens Training & Education Center –NETEC¹⁵
 - Access to the laboratory should be restricted when testing is in progress

- Only trained personnel should participate in specimen handling and processing activities. Verify that lab personnel demonstrate competency in standard precautions and biosafety
- Establish clean and contaminated zones
- Clearly pre-label tubes prior to the collection of patient specimens, and segregate VHF suspect samples when handling in the laboratory
- Manipulate samples on a plastic-backed absorbent pad
- Where possible, avoid activities that may generate aerosols (e.g., mixing samples by pipetting, centrifugation). Use safety seal cups to avoid exposure to aerosols.
- Limit the use of glass or sharps wherever possible and substitute with plastic items.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE):

- Minimal: Gloves, Water-resistant gowns, Goggles, Full face shields, Mask that covers nose and mouth
- Shoes and leg covers could be appropriate in certain circumstances such as if specimen collection is performed in a highly contaminated room.¹⁶
- Single-use PPE should not be reused and should be discarded per SOP after removal
- Reusable PPE must be decontaminated per SOP
- Waterproof rubber boots are preferred in patient-care areas with suspected/confirmed EBOD or MARD¹⁷
- Inspect all PPE before use. Consider using the Trained Observer method or buddy system to remove contaminated PPE¹⁸

- Generate PPE donning and doffing charts including the available supplies, see the example from University of Nebraska Medical Center¹⁹

Secondary Barriers for samples from suspected cases

- Use of certified, Class II biosafety cabinet (BSC) (properly maintained) for manipulation/processing of samples.
- Use of sealed safety cups or rotors for centrifuges for sample processing (load/unload in certified Class II biosafety cabinet).
- Mechanical ventilation systems that provide an inward flow of air without recirculation to spaces outside of the laboratory (recommended)
- Review the WHO Laboratory biosafety manual, 4th edition: Biological safety cabinets and other primary containment devices²⁰

Decontamination

- Use of chemical disinfectants effective against enveloped viruses must be applied to surfaces and equipment for the recommended contact time for proper decontamination. [EPA Registered Antimicrobial Products Effective Against Ebola Virus List L](#)
- VHFs are susceptible to a broad range of hospital disinfectants. Surfaces and objects contaminated with body fluids should be disinfected ensuring appropriate contact time.
- Decontamination of Point of Care instruments: consult with manufacturer
- Training and Validation: Personnel must be trained in handling waste
- Consider establishing a validation protocol for effective decontamination
- Review country-specific infection control recommendations and resilience measures²¹

- Disinfection methods and solutions should be selected based on the specific pathogen involved²²

Spill Response

- Review existing SOP to ensure that appropriate PPE and disinfectant are included for the specific pathogen
- Review notifications including Occupational health

Waste Management

- All waste contaminated with materials from patients or specimens suspected or confirmed to be infected with VHF pathogens must be treated and managed as biohazardous (regulated medical) waste.
- A method for decontaminating all laboratory waste should be available in the facility
- Review WHO document from 2021 on Ebola Virus Disease – Key Questions and answers concerning health-care waste.²³

Packaging & Transport

- Potentially infectious materials must be placed in a durable, leak proof container during collection, handling, processing, storage, or transport within a facility. To reduce the risk of breakage or leaks, do not use any pneumatic tube system for transporting suspected Ebola virus disease specimens.
- Follow local, national and international guidelines for identification, classification, packaging, labeling, and shipping. Ebola virus is classified as a Category A infectious substance by the US Department of Transportation (DOT) and International Air Transport Association (IATA).

- Specimens from persons under investigation (PUIs) for Ebola or patients confirmed to have Ebola virus infection must be packaged and shipped as Category A infectious substances.
 - Packing and shipping Category A infectious substances must be performed by persons trained and certified in compliance with US DOT and/or IATA requirements.²⁴
 - Review the WHO Interim Guidance for shipping human blood samples from suspected Ebola or Marburg cases in-country.²⁵
 - CDC Guidance for Collection, Transport and Submission of Specimens for Ebola Virus Testing in the United States.²⁶

Administrative Controls:

- Training and competency verification in donning and doffing required PPE
- Documented respirator training, clinical clearance, and fit testing per country requirement (e.g. N-95, PAPR).
- Training and competency verification for each procedure performed
- Specialized training in handling/manipulating pathogenic agents under qualified and competent supervisors.
- Demonstrated competency in working within a BSC (if available)
 - Checklist for Safe use of Biological Safety Cabinets²⁷
 - WHO Biological safety cabinets and other primary containment devices²⁸
- Biosecurity plan for managing samples (intake and transfers to other laboratories)
- Specimen accountability and chain-of-custody procedures should be maintained whenever applicable²⁹

- Established communication pathways with public health authorities should be activated before specimen shipment or testing decisions

Preparedness and Organizational Readiness²⁹

- Laboratory activation checklist
- Communication pathways
- Public health notification procedures
- Trained personnel availability
- Occupational health readiness
- Emergency spill response capability
- Inventory of supplies
- Waste management
- See NETEC's example for response plan.³⁰

Diagnostic considerations

- A negative result obtained within the first 72 hours after symptom onset may require repeat testing according to national guidance.¹⁴

Occupational Health

- Mandatory reporting of any symptoms, any laboratory exposure
- Consider baseline blood, baseline questionnaire, emergency wallet card, differential diagnosis
- Exposure follow-up procedures
- Post-exposure medical evaluation
- Healthcare personnel with potential exposure to Ebola virus should undergo active monitoring for symptoms during the 21-day incubation period following the last exposure.¹⁸

BSL4 – footnote

In the USA, the cultures and specimens containing ebolavirus must be handled at a Biosafety Level 4 (BSL4) facility with HEPA-filtrated laboratory exhaust.⁴

Other procedures and sample types that should be considered for handling at BSL4 include the following:

- Virus isolation/propagation in cell culture and initial characterization of viral agents recovered in cultures of HFV specimens
- Infectious recombinant nucleic acid
- Infection of experimental animals with any of the above

Follow the BSL4 practices and procedures for your facility

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